RV10 - Preliminary Report - N8757R

[A2022]

RV10 - ASN Report - N8757R

Well, this is the worst RV aircraft accident I am aware of to date. Both father and daughter occupants perished along with 19 injured on the ground. As RV pilots we know the risks of flying an experimental aircraft, but we are not allowed to injure people on the ground. As the agencies and lawyers dig into the paperwork and aircraft configuration, we may be able to determine the cause. Some administrative changes will need to occur because of this event. It is saddening for general aviation and everyone affected.

Some general observations can be made.

High Risk
1. He was flying from a relatively short field with displaced thresholds in a crowed metro area.
2. For whatever reason, he did not immediately return to the departure end of the runway which was much closer. Perhaps it was the reason above that forced him to a longer flight path. It can be tougher to land on short runways with passengers and full fuel because of the added weight.

Plenty of info and links on the ASN Report site
https://asn.flightsafety.org/wikibase/469542

[A2022]

Juan Browne, Bblancolirio Report

RV-10 N8757R Fullerton, CA. 2 Jan 2025
https://youtu.be/yTooZet0AYo?si=7yQPPAxV3IpwXxxF

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with an engine failure upon takeoff in a congested metro area, basically, get the nose down and keep the speed up and get back to the closest portion of the runway, the departure end. don't ask if you can return, tell them you are returning. period.

the agencies need to get into the aircraft paperwork to determine the door and engine configuration.... when you injure that many people on the ground the consequences will be severe. the pilot and his daughter are dead. who to take it out on? ...*** hell on earth.

perhaps you gave poor advice not to inspect that mag at 500 hrs, against mfg requirements, on a popular forum. can Lawyers reach back thru the internet forum veil and find that posting? just saying....

[A2022]

RV10 - Preliminary Report - N8757R

well, apparently Van's provided paperwork that confirmed they sent SB hardware for a secondary door latch to the owner, but it was never installed. it's hard for me to understand how a door becoming open or departing could cause this type of accident, but this confirms, it can happen. the door latch SB hardware is probably on a shelf in the hangar.

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/ ... 199502/pdf

The airplanes primary kit components were shipped to the pilot between 2007 and 2008, and he completed construction in 2011. The secondary door latch was included as standard in all RV-10 finish kits shipped from January 4, 2010, onwards, with a retrofit kit available for all previously constructed airplanes. Its installation was recommended before further flight as described in Service Bulletin 10-1-4, published by Vans Aircraft on January 4, 2010. Records provided by Vans Aircraft indicated that the pilot was sent the retrofit safety latch kit on January 25, 2010.

Examination of the airplane wreckage revealed that the pilot had made a series of modifications to the standard door locking system including the use of solid steel locking pins rather than the kit-supplied aluminum pins, along with replacement of the UHMW polythene door blocks with chamfered aluminum blocks. Additionally, the secondary safety latch had not been installed (see figure 1), and the door latch indicator system had been modified.

The left cabin door located on the facility roof was largely intact and had pulled away from its roof hinges. Its window had shattered, and all the plexiglass pieces were accounted for in the immediate vicinity. The door handle was found just short of the forward closed and locked position (see figure 1), and because it was not fully forward, its locking button had not engaged. The lock pins were found extended about 1/2 inch out of the door ends, and when the door handle was tested by moving it forward, the pins extended a further 7/16 inch, and the locking button engaged.